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Meyer, Pierce, and the History of the Entire Human Race:
Barbarism, Social Progress, and (the Fall and Rise of) Parental Rights

Jeffrey Shulman*

Introduction:
The Past is Prologue. But Whose Past?
In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta
assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent
education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been
deliberately approved by men of great genius their ideas touching the relation
between individual and state were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose
such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter
and spirit of the Constitution.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)
In this day and under our civilization, the child of man is his parent’s child
and not the state’s. Gone would be the most potent reason for women to be chaste
and men to be continent, if it were otherwise. It was entirely logical for Plato, in
his scheme for an “ideal commonwealth,” to make women common; if their
children were to be taken from them, and brought up away from them by the state
for its own ends and purposes, personal morality was, after all, a secondary
matter. The state-bred monster could then mean little to his parents; and such a
creature could readily be turned to whatever use a tyrannical government might
conceive to be in its own interest. In such a society there would soon be neither
personal nor social liberty.
Brief of Appellee
(William Guthrie and Bernard Hershkopf)
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)1
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On February 23, 1923, attorney Arthur F. Mullen stood before the United States Supreme
Court to protest a state law that, in his words, would “change the history of the entire human
race.”2 For Mullen, as for the Court, this dire declaration was not mere hyperbole. The occasion
was the case Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), which would determine the fate, if not of the entire
human race, of a 1919 Nebraska state statute prohibiting the teaching of modern foreign
languages in the primary grades of all schools, public and private.3 On its face the law would not
seem to hold such apocalyptic implications, but the statute touched the highly sensitive twin
nerves of both parental authority and family autonomy. For the plaintiff in error, Mullen argued
that, in effect, the state was claiming the authority to establish a curricular monopoly at school,
and, practically perhaps, at home. By “mere fiat” the state could “take the child from the parent
and prescribe the mental bill of fare which that child shall follow in its education.”4 This,
Mullen warned the Court, was “the principle of the soviet.”5
Meyer was a creature of its judicial time, one of many early twentieth-century cases that
dealt with challenges to state educational regulation. Such matters as compulsory attendance and
curricular requirements generated heated debate, both in and out of the courtroom, for these
cases were not just about the legal question of who controls the child’s education. At bottom,
they were about the more profound question of to whom the child belongs. On this question
many people did believe that the history of the human race might hang.
Mullen’s reference to soviet principle was not mere window-dressing. The Russian
Revolution, which brought with it a radical skepticism toward the private family, seemed to
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
262 U.S. 390 (1923). The state statute also had imposed restrictions on the use of foreign languages as a medium
of instruction.
4
Transcript of Oral Argument, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 2, at 8.
5
Id.
3
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make only too concrete the threat from an all-grasping state.6 Communist theory taught that the
abolition of the family was the fruit of history’s steady and upward march to an antipatriarchal
and property-less new world order. For Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, history is the story of
social progress, the central motif of which involves the demise of privacy and possession. The
idea that the child belongs to the parent, so the story runs, is symptomatic of cultures mired in a
primitive patriarchalism. As society progresses, the family assumes a public responsibility—and
thus becomes part of the ordinary business of the state, and subject to ordinary state regulation.
In time, the private family, like the material conditions of which it is a product, will be no more
than a vestige of the patriarchal past.
In the 1920s, it appeared to many that state paternalism was already running amok at
home, and that, as Mullen warned, the state as educator would soon be able to take children from
their parents and bring them up for its own ends and purposes. In 1922, the year before Meyer
reached the Court, the voters of Oregon approved an initiative mandating public education. The
next year, in Meyer, the law professor William Dameron Guthrie filed an amicus brief
specifically, and preemptively, to address the Oregon compulsory public school law, the
constitutionality of which would be decided in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).7 Guthrie
described the Oregon act as “a revolutionary piece of legislation,” his brief evoking images of
Bolshevik menace:
The Red Scare has been described as “a nation-wide anti-radical hysteria provoked by a mounting fear and anxiety
that a Bolshevik revolution in America was imminent—a revolution that would change Church, home, marriage,
civility, and the American way of life.” MURRAY B. LEVIN, POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC
CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION 29 (1971).
7
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). On the historical
background of Meyer and Pierce, see generally PAULA ABRAMS, CROSS PURPOSES: PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER COMPULSORY PUBLIC EDUCATION (2009); WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS:
NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1917–1927 (1994); DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES, AND AARON
BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785–1954 177-92 (1987); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
“Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992);
William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 125 (1988);
David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1968)
6
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It adopts the favorite device of communistic Russia—the destruction of parental
authority, the standardization of education despite the diversity of character, aptitude,
inclination and physical capacity of children, and the monopolization by the state of the
training and teaching of the young. The love and interest of the parent for his child, such
a statute condemns as evil; the instinctive preferences and desires of the child itself, such
a law represses as if mere manifestations of an incorrigible or baneful disposition.8
In the Court’s first Lochnerian foray into non-economic substantive due process, the shadow of
socialist child-raising was never far from the legal debate
History is sometimes spoken of as the final court of judgment. But in Meyer and Pierce
the Court sat in judgment of history. On trial, it might be said, was not just the principle of the
soviet, but one of the driving historical principles of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The era witnessed the emergence of new disciplines that embraced a materialistic theory of
cultural progress and an evolutionary view of law. In place of right reasoning, to say nothing of
revealed dogma, sociologists and cultural anthropologists brought the methods of empirical
research, or at least what at the time passed for empirical research, to bear on questions relating
to family and the state. One result of these early social science efforts was the enormously
influential stage-theory of societal development.9 Simply enough, stage-theory describes how a
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Brief for William D. Guthrie & Bernard Hershkopf as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-in-Error at 3, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325).
9
On “stadial” or “conjectural” history, see generally CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, SOCIAL THEORY OF THE SCOTTISH
ENLIGHTENMENT (1997); DAVID SPADAFORA, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1990);
RONALD L. MEEK, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE IGNOBLE SAVAGE (1976); see also KAREN O’BRIEN, WOMEN AND
ENLIGHTENMENT IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 85-109 (2009). On stadial theory and European colonialism,
see Jennifer Pitts, Empire, Progress, and the “Savage Mind,” in COLONIALISM AND ITS LEGACIES 21-52 (Jacob T.
Levy ed. with Iris Marion Young, 2011). Gordon S. Wood, among others, has shown how important stage theory
was in America’s early intellectual and cultural history. See, e.g., EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 42-43, 385-99 (2009). Thomas Jefferson’s observations on America’s stadial geography are
well known: “Let a philosophic traveler commence a journey from the savages of the Rocky Mountains, eastwardly
towards our seacoast. These he would observe in the earliest stage of association, living under no law but that of
nature, subsisting and covering themselves with the flesh and skin of wild beasts. He would next find those on our
frontiers, in the pastoral state, raising domestic animals to supply the defects of hunting. Then succeed our own
semi-barbarous citizens the pioneers of advance civilization, and so in his progress he would meet the gradual
shades of improving man until he would reach his, as yet, most improved state in our seaboard towns. This, in fact,
is equivalent to a survey, in time, of the progress of man from the infancy of creation to the present.” Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to William Ludlow, September 6, 1824, reprinted in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 337
(H. A. Washington ed., Taylor and Maury, Washington, D.C., 1864). On Jefferson and the development of early
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society moves from a primitive to a civilized state of development, and how it might fail to do
so. For some stage-theorists, their own society provided a model of civilized achievement; for
others, more work remained to be done. In either case, stage-theorists and the legal scholars they
influenced, with remarkable uniformity, concluded that social “progress” entails the decline and,
by some accounts, the demise of parental authority.
This “research” was primitive by modern standards, and, it probably goes without saying,
blatantly ethnocentric. But the accuracy of the science is beside the point. This body of work
helps us see that prior to the Court’s seminal parenting cases some of the most influential
students of law and society considered a rigid domestic paternalism, unhampered by
governmental interference, to be nothing less than a mark of social primitivism. Progress did not
lie in the direction of parental rights, in the direction, that is, of a family unit walled off from the
public domain by constitutional considerations. Progress occurred as the authority of the
parent—and, of course, this meant for the most part the authority of the father—was checked by
public considerations, including the welfare of the child.
The Supreme Court struck back at this “progressive” model by making its own
evolutionary claim. History remained progressive, but, as the Court would have it, the
betterment of society brings with it the steady diminution of state authority, nowhere more so
than in state regulation of the family. Meyer is famous for its repudiation of ancient models of
the paternalistic state. For the Court, Justice James Clark McReynolds compared Nebraska’s
language prohibition to the communistic parenting measures of ancient Sparta (“In order to
submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into

American anthropology, see ROBERT L. BETTINGER, RAVEN GARVEY & SHANNON TUSHINGHAM, HUNTERGATHERERS: ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 35-36 (2d ed. 2015).
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barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians.”10) and
Plato’s Republic (“[T]he wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be
common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent.”11). Such measures,
said McReynolds, rested on an allocation of educational control wholly at odds with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution.12 This cautionary note was heard again in Pierce. Once more
writing for the Court, McReynolds made the case one about the power of the state “to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”13 He
famously declared that “[t]he child was not the mere creature of the state.”14 In a civilized
society, the child is decidedly his parent’s.
McReynolds might have agreed with Judge (and later Supreme Court Justice) Rufus
Peckham, who would author Lochner,15 that at last history had reached a turning point. Writing
in 1899, Peckham described the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a time “when views of
governmental interference with the private concerns of individuals were carried to the greatest
extent.”16 He denounced state paternalism as a throwback to the false ideas of a bygone time
when “[r]ights which we would now regard as secured to us by our bill of rights against all
assaults, from whatever quarter, were . . . regarded as the proper subjects of legislative
interference and suppression.”17 Similarly, Judge David Brewer, who would join Peckham’s

10

262 U.S. at 401–02. In American political thought, Sparta—or, perhaps more accurately, the idea of Sparta—held
a richer repository of meanings than McReynolds’ representation of the city-state suggests. For some of the
Founding Fathers, Sparta served as a model of republican virtue, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 424 (1969), an example of self-sacrifice that led Samuel Adams to hope that
America would become “the Christian Sparta,” see id. at 118.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
268 U.S. at 535.
14
Id.
15
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16
People ex rel. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 686 (N.Y. 1899) (Peckham, J., dissenting).
17
Id. at 687.
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opinion for the Lochner court, wrote in 1892 to deplore the effects of unwarranted state
regulation (pictured so well in Edward Bellamy’s bestselling look backward at the future).
The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost possible liberty to the
individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and his property, is both the
limitation and duty of government. If it may regulate the price of one service which is
not a public service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property, which is not
devoted to a public use, why may it not with equal reason regulate the price of all service,
and the compensation to be paid for the use of all property? And, if so, ‘Looking
Backward’ is nearer than a dream.18
Thankfully, from Peckham’s point of view, a new era was embracing “the more correct
ideas which an increase of civilization and a fuller knowledge of the fundamental laws of
political economy, and a truer conception of the proper functions of government have given us at
the present day.”19 Looking backward, the Court’s Lochnerians saw what to them were the
odious features of paternalistic government. Looking forward, they saw the promise of a modern
libertarian state.
With regard to America’s family law past, the claim that a paternalistic past had made
“rights” the subject of legislative interference was not far off the mark. It is commonly assumed
that “[h]istorically, fathers were entitled to possession of their children. . . . In essence, fathers
had an absolute right to their children, ‘owning’ them as if they held ‘title’ to them.”20 For many
parentalists,21 the right to parent is considered a time-honored staple of personal liberty deeply
rooted in the common law and guaranteed by core constitutional principles. For some, of course,
18

Budd v. People, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 47 (1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting).
20
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 737 (1988); cf., e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2406 (1995) (“Before the twentieth century, the combined status of biological
parenthood and marriage signified a legal authority [over children] of almost limitless scope.”); Janet L. Dolgin, Just
a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 645 n.29 (1993) (Before the Industrial
Revolution, “under common law, fathers had an absolute right to the custody of their children. The common law
view [of paternal rights] represented a modification of Roman law under which children were fully defined as
paternal property.”) (citation omitted).
21
I take the term “parentalist” from the strongly argued essay by Stephen Gilles On Educating Children: A
Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996).
19
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the right to parent emanates from law with an even more compelling lineage. It is a right often
presented as prescribed by natural law, as higher than the Constitution, “precedent, both in order
of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society” (as James Madison put it);22
and state interference with parental rights is thus a betrayal of even greater proportions. Whether
the right to parent is understood as man-made or the work of some greater author, parentalists
argue that state interference with parental decisionmaking erodes the historical—even timeless,
perhaps—bedrock of fundamental personal liberties.
It turns out, though, that in the American legal tradition the roots of parental rights are
relatively shallow. In fact, this is a tradition that treated paternal absolutism and its rights
foundation as barbaric.23 “That the father had any such absolute right to the care and custody of
his children,” that the state lacked the authority to “control the conduct of the father in the
education of his children”—these propositions, Joseph Story wrote, “would strike all civilized
countries with astonishment.”24 In the nineteenth century, court after court, and commentator
after commentator, declared that the “old barbarity has gradually given way until the modern
civilization concedes to the child the same human attributes which it acknowledges in the
father.”25 The New York state Supreme Court of Judicature was hardly alone when it declared
that “[t]hose countries in which the father has a general power to dispose of his children, have

22

JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS,
ON CHURCH AND STATE 18 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1988).

in THE SUPREME COURT

See, e.g., State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 411 (1870) (“The duties and authority pertaining to the relation of parent
and child have their foundations in nature, it is true. Nevertheless, all civilized governments have regarded this
relation as falling within the legitimate scope of legislative control. Except in countries which lie in barbarism, the
authority of the parent over the child is nowhere left absolutely without municipal definition and regulation.”).
24
Joseph Story, 2 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 578 (§ 1347) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co., 1836).
25
JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 2 NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION 454 (§ 1163)
(Chicago, T. H. Flood & Co. 1891) (“Under laws which have prevailed in some ages and countries, rendering the
child a sort of chattel in the hands of its father, who could sell or kill it, the paternal right to its custody was
necessarily inflexible. But this old barbarity has gradually given way until the modern civilization concedes to the
child the same human attributes which it acknowledges in the father.”) (footnote omitted).
23
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always been considered barbarous. Our own law never has allowed the exercise of such
power.”26
Long before the Supreme Court’s seminal parenting cases took a due process turn,
American courts had been working to fashion family law doctrine on the premise that parents are
only entrusted with custody of the child, and then only as long as they meet their fiduciary duty
to take proper care of the child. This theme was embraced enthusiastically by American jurists.
It was with no little self-satisfaction that they endorsed a child-centered jurisprudence that
bypassed the paternalistic family law of their British counterparts. American courts, to quote
family law treatise writer Joel Bishop, travelled “more rapidly toward the light than in
England.”27 However deeply rooted paternal prerogatives were in British common law, such
rights found tough purchase in American soil.28 By the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
one American court could confidently—admittedly, too confidently—proclaim that “[t]he

26

People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 411 (N.Y. Sup. 1842); cf. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 205 (O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., 12th ed. Littleton, Co., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1873) (code of parentchild relations under Roman law “was barbarous, and unfit for a free and civilized people”). Reviewing the history
of custody case law, the New York state Court for the Correction of Errors observed that “the American cases . . .
showed it to be the established law of this country that the court, or officer, were authorized to exercise a discretion,
and that the father was not entitled to demand a delivery of the child to him, upon habeas corpus, as an absolute
right.” Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 93 (N.Y. 1840). This was, the court pointed out, “also the law
of England at the time of our separation from the mother country.” Id. But since that period the decisions of the
English courts “appeared to have gone back to the principles of a semi-barbarous age, when the wife was the slave
of the husband, because he had the physical power to control her, and when the will of the strongest party
constituted the rule of right.” Id. The Court of Errors took evident pride in noting that “[t]his state has never been
disgraced by laws so subversive of the welfare of infant children, of the rights of mothers, and of the morals of the
people.” Id. at 105 (opinion of Alonzo C. Paige).
27
BISHOP, 2 NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 25, at 454–55 (§ 1163); cf. NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN
DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 24 (1999) (“From both a substantive and
procedural perspective, divorce law in the early republic was light years beyond its English equivalent.”).
28
The great precedent regarding the proper response of the court was Lord Mansfield’s twofold declaration in Rex v.
Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434, 1436 (K.B. 1763), that “[i]n cases of writs of habeas corpus directed to private persons, ‘to
bring up infants,’” (1) “the Court is bound, ex debito justitiae, to set the infant free from an improper restraint,” but
(2) “they [i.e., the courts] are not bound to deliver them over to any body nor to give them any privilege.” The
child’s deliverance was not an abstract question of rights. It was a matter that “must be left to [the courts’]
discretion, according to the circumstances that shall appear before them”; and if the child were of sufficient age, it
was a matter on which the court would defer to his or her discretion. See JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD 48-49 (2014).
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substantial reality of the old common law right [of custody] has faded almost to fiction under the
ameliorating influence of the modern common law.”29
This anti-patriarchal sentiment was no respecter of ideological boundary lines. The
theory was congenial to the moral philosophers and social theorists of the Scottish
Enlightenment, whose confidence in human progress was a philosophic seedbed for America’s
revolutionary generation; to libertarian-minded contractualists of late-nineteenth-century
America, from whose lack of confidence in government emerged a model of social evolution that
equated liberty with individual self-assertion, natural rights, and national wealth-building; and to
the founding fathers of revolutionary socialism. It was a part of the nineteenth century’s great
idiom of secular progress and pragmatic social engineering, a story of worldly advancement and
human achievement in which the courts had their own, not insignificant, role to play. If Marx
and Engels took anti-patriarchalism to its radical end-point, they were travelling on a well-worn
path.
Part I of this article looks at what might be the most formative application of stage-theory
to family relations, John Millar’s The Origins of the Distinctions of Ranks (1771).30 Drawing on
the sociohistorical work of David Hume and Adam Smith, Millar provides an empirical account
of how rights of personal authority (the right of husband over wife, father over children, and
master over servant) arise out of and evolve in response to changing socioeconomic conditions.

29

Dixon v. Dixon, 2 Pa. C.C. 125, 127 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1886) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Lippincott v.
Lippincott, 124 A. 532, 533 (N.J. Ch. 1924) (The day had long passed “when the rights of infants to be properly
nurtured are subordinate to the strict legal rights of parents.”).
30
JOHN MILLAR, THE ORIGIN OF THE DISTINCTION OF RANKS: OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
GIVE RISE TO INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY IN THE DIFFERENT MEMBERS OF SOCIETY (4th ed., 1806). The fourth
edition, with an Introduction by Aaron Garrett, is available at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=287&Itemid=27, as part of the Online
Library of Liberty, a project of Liberty Fund, Inc. The third edition, with an Introduction by William Lehman, is
reprinted in WILLIAM C. LEHMAN, JOHN MILLAR OF GLASGOW 1735-180: HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT AND HIS
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 167-322 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1960). Quotations herein to THE
ORIGIN OF THE DISTINCTION OF RANKS are from the Lehman edition.
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For Millar, these rights do not exist “above” or “before” society; rather, they are the product of
material circumstances, and they evolve as the human condition, both socially and individually—
for the two are intertwined31—progresses. Parental rights are thus both adventitious (deriving
from specific human conditions) and normative (deriving their authority from their contribution
to human fulfillment). They change in response to changing conditions, and they ought to move,
though they do not do so inevitably or permanently, in the direction of greater liberty and
equality. The material and moral development of the parent-child relationship, Millar seeks to
demonstrate, mirrors in microcosm the processes of social evolution. 32 The personal replicates
the political; it shapes it and is shaped by it. For Millar, there is little doubt that parental
authority “has been reduced within narrower bounds, in proportion to the ordinary improvements
of society.”33
A product of the Scottish Enlightenment’s focus on sociability, Millar’s historical critique
of paternal authority translated comfortably to the individualistic currents of the nineteenth
century. Part II of this article looks at the work of two prominent libertarian legal theorists: the
British comparative cultural historian Henry Maine and the British moral philosopher Herbert
Spencer. Though these writers took different routes through the emerging sociological territory
of the nineteenth century, they both employed the tools of comparative and historical
jurisprudence, and they agreed that the historical record dictated the conclusion that there is no
social progress without the repudiation of patriarchalism.

See, e.g., DANIEL I. O’NEILL, THE BURKE-WOLLSTONECRAFT DEBATE: SAVAGERY, CIVILIZATION AND
DEMOCRACY 44 (2007) (noting how “successive stages of social development” were considered “part of a positive
natural progression, analogous to that of an individual human being as he passed from infancy to maturity”).
32
Stage theory, for Millar and for such theorists as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, did not entail an unqualified
belief in progress. On this point, Duncan Forbes very usefully compares the scientific evolutionism of Millar with
the radical utopianism of more polemical writers like Joseph Priestly and William Godwin. See “Scientific
Whiggism”: Adam Smith and John Millar, 7 CAMBRIDGE J. 643, 648-52 (1953).
33
MILLAR, RANKS (3d ed.), supra note 30, at 239.
31
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Sir Henry Maine is most famous for his argument that society and its legal framework
evolved “from Status to Contract.”34 Less attention has been paid to a conclusion that, for
Maine, follows from his contractualist thesis: that the movement of “progressive” societies
involves a steady reduction in both paternal power and family dependency. The early stage of
the family empire, as described by Maine, was a true “domestic despotism.”35 But imperial rule
at home followed the course of the political empire, falling before a legal order based on
voluntary association, under which the family, like society at large, is the product of free
agreement among free individuals.
Herbert Spencer has the dubious distinction of being closely associated with—indeed,
perhaps of being the philosophical progenitor of—the Supreme Court’s foray into classical
liberalism (and its case-law poster-child, Lochner v. New York36). The radical libertarianism of
Spencer on parent-child relations is rarely discussed. Spencer applied his principle of equal
liberty to besiege the archaic precincts of despotic paternalism—the “arbitrary rule of one human
being over another, no matter in what form it may appear.”37 Even when it appeared in the form
of parental care. Actually, especially when. Spencer held a particular antipathy toward the
assertion of despotic domestic sovereignty. “Uncover its roots,” he writes, “and the theory of

34

HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS
RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 170 (4th ed., London, John Murray 1870).
35
Id. at 137.
36
Spencer is most well known, thanks in no small part to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for his SOCIAL
STATICS: OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1872). See
Lochner, supra note 15, at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does
not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is
interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for
purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics.”).
37
SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, at 183.

12

paternal authority will be found not to grow out of man’s love for his offspring but out of his
love of dominion.”38
(The libertarian treatise writer Christopher Tiedeman also belongs in this category. His
exposition of constitutional law, A Treatise on the Limitations of Police Power in the United
States, has earned him a place in the pantheon of proponents of limited government.39 A foe of
state paternalism and a fierce critic of socialism, Tiedeman nonetheless considered parental
authority to be “in the nature of a trust, reposed in [the parent] by the dictate of the State.”40 He
makes the historical argument that when the ancient family evolved from a freestanding political
entity to what he calls a “domestic relation,” children became autonomous members of the
collective polity, at which point they “acquire[d] political and civil rights, independently of the
father.”41 For Tiedeman, “[t]he parent has no natural vested right to the control of the child”; to
the contrary, parental control “may be extended or contracted, according as the public welfare
may require.”42 I have discussed Tiedeman elsewhere.43)
With its focus on economic conditions and its pragmatic approach to rights, stage-theory
could be put to far more radical uses. In the socialist utopia imagined by Marx and Engels, the
private family would vanish along with private property and profit. In fact, the Soviet Union had
the opportunity to practice what it preached, unleashing the chains of domestic oppression with
the 1918 Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship. Part III of this article has two goals:
to remind readers 1) that socialist historymaking considered the dissolution of the bourgeois
family as a key step toward a stateless state, and 2) that this repudiation of the family was no
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CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (St.
Louis, F. H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886).
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Id. at 553.
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Id. at 552.
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mere doctrinal abstraction for American legal professionals. As the Supreme Court weighed the
competing claims of parent and state, the threat of a socialist takeover of the family—“the
principle of the soviet”—was always close at hand.
In response to this unhappy prospect, the Court drew from the murky, mysterious well of
state-constraining liberties we refer to as substantive due process. Meyer and Pierce widened the
constitutional portal for a deeply individualistic and fiercely libertarian notion of natural law that
the Court had opened in its economic regulation cases.44 Compelled to seek some objective
measure of what process is constitutionally due, the Court began to write its own narrative of
social progress, a story whose theme was the deep-rootedness of deference to parental
authority.45 Repudiating statist, communistic models like Sparta, this story, premised on a
cursory and tendentious treatment of ancient family law, put forward a new legal ethnohistory.
Sparta was the barbaric beginning of the cultural negotiation between parent and state; social
primitivism lay not in the patriarchal family but in the paternalistic state, and progress lay not in
a movement from personal rights to public responsibilities, but just the reverse. With regard to
domestic life, this narrative of progress was one of struggle: the struggle of parents against an
ever encroaching state. In time, however, regulation of the family would no longer be
considered one of the proper functions of government. By making a claim loosely based on
historical sociology—that is, a claim about the origin and development of family life and
Of course, natural law theory need not be dominated by a focus on individual rights. On natural rights as “being
mere means to the fulfillment of duties,” see KNUD HAAKNOSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM
GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 6 (1996).
45
David Upham argues that the Pierce Court declined the invitation to embrace a spacious, natural-rights position in
support of parental authority. He notes that the Court “indicated that the right to direct a child’s education results
not from a natural familial relation, but simply as a necessary concomitant to the power of custody, however defined
and assigned. For the Court, it was not natural parenthood that gave both custodial and educational rights; it was
custodial power—whether resulting from biology, positive law, or otherwise—that gave educational rights.” David
R. Upham, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Natural Law, and the Pope’s Extraordinary—But Undeserved—Praise of the
American Republic [Draft], 12, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018396 (footnote
omitted).
44
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parental authority—McReynolds co-opted the methodology of a substantial body of “scientific”
research that had challenged—indeed, rejected—the progressiveness of legal regimes affording
great deference to parental rights. Now, the Supreme Court had its own history to recount. If
history has an ash heap, and if the Court had its way, Sparta would be relegated to it.

I
John Millar:
Anti-Patriarchalism and the Social State

For the moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment—whose influence on American
legal history and culture was considerable—sociability was the key to understanding human
nature and civil society.46 The principle of sociability takes society as the true state of nature.
Mankind is made, and has always been made, for society; we are endowed with an instinctive
fellow-feeling, and it is from this natural well of human benevolence that rights arise. Within
this moral framework, as Aaron Garrett explains, “[w]e have various duties and roles as humans,
as parents, as parishioners, etc., which arise from different features of our human ‘frame’; they
are natural to us, as sociable human beings who seek and need other human beings.”47 “Natural”

46

On the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on American revolutionary ideology, see generally GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 168-255 (1978); cf. generally WILLIAM J.
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 19-50 (1996). But
see Gordon S. Wood, “Influence’ in History” in THE PURPOSE OF THE PAST: REFLECTIONS ON THE USES OF HISTORY
17-29 (2008) (reviewing GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981)). On “The Bonds of
Affection” in early American history, see MELVIN YAZAWA, FROM COLONIES TO COMMONWEALTH: FAMILIAL
IDEOLOGY AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 9-18 (1985); on “The Missing Dimension of
Sociality” in modern law, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE
109-44 (1991).
47
Aaron Garrett, Francis Hutcheson and the Origin of Animal Rights, 45 J. HIST. OF PHIL. 243, 249 (2007); cf.
NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1793) 34, cited in NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S
WELFARE, supra note 46, at 34 (“The rights of man are relative to his social nature, and the rights of the individual
exist, in a coincidence only with the rights of the whole, in a well-ordered state of society and civil.”); see also
CHIPMAN, SKETCHES, 111–12 (“[Rights] arise in society and are relative to it. Antecedently to that state, they could
only exist potentially. The rights of all have a reciprocal relation to the rights of each, and can never be rightly
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rights, in other word, are a product of our social roles and their accompanying social obligations.
They enable social beings to act on their natural sympathetic endowment, to carry out the duties
attendant upon the roles that social beings naturally assume. Garrett illustrates the idea this way:
“We are granted a right to property, in order to feed our families and ourselves. We have a right
over our children, in order to teach them and help them to grow.”48 (Or, as Mark Hopkins, a
professor of moral philosophy at Williams College from 1836 to 1872, put it, “A man has rights
in order that he may do right.”49)
It is hardly surprising that moral theorists like Francis Hutcheson would tie the right to
parent to the parent’s role as educational trustee. It is the parent who teaches the child how to
cultivate natural benevolence, doing do not just by direct instruction, but by example as well. If
benevolence is the source of public duty, its practice begins at home. Its domestic starting point
is the repudiation (as contrary to “natural justice”) of the ancient idea that the father possesses a
sovereign power over family affairs. “[The] grand end of the parental power,” Hutcheson writes,
“shows that it includes few of those rights contained in the patria potestas of the Romans. The
child is a rational moral agent, with rights valid against the parents; though they are the natural
tutors or curators, and have a right to direct the actions, and manage the goods of the child, for its
benefit, during its want of proper knowledge.”50 Parental authority is a right only in the sense
that a fiduciary has the right to fulfill his or her delegated social responsibility, assumed for the

apprehended, distinct from that relation”). For a contemporary statement of this theme, we might turn to Michael
Sandel: “The morality of right . . . speaks to that which distinguishes us, the morality of good corresponds to the
unity of persons and speaks to that which connects us.” LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 133 (1982); cf.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 256 (1986) (“The importance of liberal rights is in their service to the
public good.”).
48
Garrett, supra note 47, at 249.
49
MARK HOPKINS, LECTURES ON MORAL SCIENCE 256 (1876) 256, cited in NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra
note 46, at 33. For a recent effort to link rights and responsibilities, see generally JAMES E. FLEMING AND LINDA C.
MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013).
50
FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 192 (Glasgow: R. and A. Foulis; London: A. Millar and
T. Longman, 1755).
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eventual enfranchisement of the child, and thus it is an authority limited in scope, time, and
means.51
By the time of the Scottish Enlightenment, this focus on parenting as mentorship for a
state of common sociability had a strong pedigree among natural rights theorists. In On The
Duty of Man and Citizen According to the Natural Law (1672), to cite one example, jurist and
philosopher Samuel von Pufendorf declared that “the fundamental moral law is this: that every
man must cherish and maintain sociability, so far as in him lies.”52 It follows from this that “all
things which necessarily and universally make for that sociability are understood to be ordained
by natural law, and that confuse or destroy it forbidden.”53 Whether we think of the state of
nature “either as it is represented by a figment, or as it really exists,”54 Pufendorf maintains, it is
no sociable place. It is a place of “equal immunity from all subjection” and thus equal subjection
to “the rule of passion, war, fear, poverty, ugliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, savagery.”55
Nasty, brutish, and short: This is what natural liberty looks like, and we gladly exchange it for
the “adventitious states,”56 the social bonds we cultivate as members of the civil state. Because
“[t]he nature of man is so constituted that the race cannot be preserved without the social life,”57

William Blackstone observes that, though sufficient to keep a child in order, “[t]he power of a parent by our
English laws is much more moderate” than that prescribed by the municipal law of other nations. Blackstone rejects
a “very large and absolute authority” for the parent, insisting that the parent may “lawfully correct his child,” but
only “in a reasonable manner.” Correction must be “for the benefit of [the child’s] education.” The power of the
parent is finite in duration as well as scope, for it is directed toward the time, that is, when “the empire of the father .
. . gives place to the empire of reason.” The child is “enfranchised by arriving at years of discretion.” 1
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 440-41 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1765).
52
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, 2 ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL LAW 19 (Frank
Gardner Moore trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1682 ed. 1927) (1672?).
53
Id.
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Id. at 90.
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Id. at 91.
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Id. at 104.
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the parent’s task is to “bring up children well, that they may turn out fit members of human
society.”58
Pudendorf cites two main causes from which the authority of parents over their children
arises. First, the natural law “in commanding man to be social, enjoined upon parents the care of
their children.”59 That parents might not neglect this care “[n]ature at the same time implanted in
them the tenderest affection for their offspring.”60 The focus here is on parental duty, not
parental right, as natural. For the proper care of children, “there is needed the power to direct the
actions of children,” but it is a power to direct, not control; and it is a power to direct the actions
of children “for their own welfare, which they do not yet understand themselves, owing to their
lack of judgment.”61 Second, Pufendorf contends that parental authority “rests upon the tacit
consent also of the offspring.” This is, needless to say, a presumed consent, but rightly presumed
because
if an infant had had the use of reason at the time of its birth, and had seen that it could not
save its life without the parents’ care and the authority therewith connected, it would
gladly have consented to it, and would in turn have made an agreement with them for a
suitable bringing-up.62
The parents’ authority, Pufendorf stresses, “is established when they take up the child and
nurture it, and undertake to form it, to the best of their ability, into a fit member of human
society.” It is the nurturing task that provides the proper measure of parental authority. Parents
have “only so much authority . . . as suffices for this purpose.”63 This fiduciary model of the
parent-child relationship would have great appeal to political theorists like John Locke and no
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little influence on the political temper and educational practices of the emerging American
republic.64
It was John Millar’s accomplishment to bring natural law speculation about the origin of
parental authority down to earth. He did so by describing in historical terms how forms of
authority, including parental authority, arise from and evolve in response to specific material
conditions. Millar’s The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (1771; revised in 1779) has been
hailed as “one of the most important works in all the history of family studies.”65 By looking at
the family through the lens of “conjectural” history, Millar was able to present a history of
personal rights as the product of social progress. In his work, as Ronald L. Meek claims, “the
new social science of the Enlightenment comes of age”: “No one before Millar had ever used a
materialist conception of history . . . so ably and so consistently to illuminate the development of
such a wide range of social phenomena.”66
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See SHULMAN, supra note 28, at 23-29, 39-36.
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(1976).
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Though tender affection for one’s offspring may be a feature of human nature, the shape
that that affection takes is, for Millar, a social phenomenon. His treatment of family relations
and the feelings that “belong” to them as the product of particular socioeconomic circumstances
boldly rejects any idealistic notion of paternal mastery. The husband is not the wife’s natural
superior, nor does some higher law proclaim the parent to be the child’s natural guardian. There
is nothing “natural” about these relationships. They evolve (or fail to) as society evolves (or fails
to).67 Millar does speak of natural rights “which belong to mankind antecedent to the formation
of civil society.” 68 In a state of nature, “we should be entitled to maintain our personal safety, to
exercise our natural liberty, so far as it does not encroach upon the rights of others; and even to
maintain a property in those things which we have come to possess, by original occupancy, or by
our labour in producing them.”69 Yet if these rights are not entirely lost when we enter into
society, they are “differently modified,” and a part of them is resigned “for the sake of those
advantages to be derived from the social state.”70
The genius of the social state, Millar writes, is to compensate us for the resignation of
natural rights, and to burden us with restraints no greater “than are necessary for the general
prosperity and happiness.”71 A political system may be “defective by too great strictness of
regulation,” but, Millar hastens to add, more “have deviated widely from the purpose by too
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great laxity.”72 And this laxity allows for a tyranny of individuals or of ranks that produces
nothing “but a residue of despotism.”73
[T]he greatest number [of political systems] have almost totally failed in producing
happiness and security from the tyranny of individuals, or of particular orders and ranks,
who, by . . . acquiring exorbitant power, have reduced their fellow-citizens into a state of
servile subjection.74
The same might be said of family “systems.” Indeed, for Millar, the treatment of the family’s
vulnerable members—women and children—serves as a barometer of social evolution.75 The
tyranny of individuals in the private life of the family and the public life of the community—it is
one and the same.76 The new cultural historiography of the eighteenth century (so reminiscent of
the new historicism of the late twentieth century) made the interior life of the family, with its
shifting social dynamics, as much the scholar’s business as are public affairs of state.
That family life and the course of its evolution are not identical from culture to culture
Millar attributes to “the differences of situation, which have suggested different views and
motives of action to the inhabitants of particular countries.”77 These differences of situation are
the material conditions of culture: “Of this kind, are the fertility or barrenness of the soil, the
nature of its productions, the species of labour requisite for procuring subsistence, the number of
individuals collected together in one community, their proficiency in arts, the advantages which
they enjoy for entering into mutual transactions, and for maintaining an intimate
72
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correspondence.”78 Such material circumstances—in effect, a people’s mode of subsistence—
Millar maintains, “have a prodigious influence upon the great body of a people.”79 Particular
circumstances “giv[e] a peculiar direction” to a people’s inclinations and pursuits; they are
“productive of correspondent habits, dispositions, and ways of thinking.”80
Particular circumstances notwithstanding, social progress, if unimpeded, moves “from
ignorance to knowledge, and from rude to civilized manners.”81 Advances in the the material
world produce alterations in the moral world.
By such gradual advances in rendering their situation more comfortable, the most
important alterations are produced in the state and condition of a people: their numbers
are increased; the connections of society are extended; and men, being less oppressed
with their own wants, are more at liberty to cultivate the feelings of humanity: property,
the great source of distinction among individuals, is established; and the various rights of
mankind, arising from their multiplied connections, are recognised and protected: the
laws of a country are thereby rendered numerous; and a more complex form of
government becomes necessary, for distributing justice, and for preventing the disorders
which proceed from the jarring interests and passions of a large and opulent
community.82
Human society, in other words, is the fruit of human cultivation—cultivation of the natural
world, of the humane feelings—not the product of pre-social contracting.83 What is natural is the
human capacity to civilize nature. (Man “has in himself a principle of progression, and a desire
for perfection,” writes Adam Ferguson in An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767); so it is
improper to say “that he has quitted the state of his nature, when he has begun to proceed; or that
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he finds a station for which he was not intended, while, like other animals, he only follows the
disposition, and employs the powers that nature has given.”84) The natural order is the social
order; the social order is the moral order, the order that is built on the human “disposition and
capacity for improving [one’s] condition, by the exertion of which, he is carried on from one
degree of advancement to another.”85 Thus, Garrett can describe the Ranks as “offer[ing] the
elements of an empirical moral theory.”86 Daniel J. O’Neill puts it nicely when he writes that the
theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment sought “to trace how human beings . . . developed a
second nature in the move from ‘rude’ to ‘civil’ society, the latter state in some sense a
convention, but a convention that was entirely natural to human beings, as ‘art itself is natural to
man.’”87
Millar goes so far as to reject a concept that remains today one of the most commonplace
of family law commonplaces: that parents have a natural affection for the child that causes them
to secure the child’s welfare. Millar observes that “parental fondness . . . has been found so
extensive and universal that it is commonly regarded as the effect of an immediate propensity,”88
but the real origin of such solicitude is to be explained in historical and materialist terms.89 It is
only to be expected that the father, as the head of his family, “should have an inclination to
promote the welfare and prosperity of his children.”90 This inclination is reinforced by “[t]he
helpless and miserable state in which [children] are produced,” which can hardly fail “to excite
84
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[the father’s] pity, and to solicit, in a peculiar manner, the protection of that person from whom
they have derived their existence.”91 As children grow, the father “is more warmly engaged on
their behalf in proportion to the efforts which he has made for their benefit, and his affection for
them is increased by every new mark of his kindness.”92 Paternal fondness grows by the same
behavioralistic principles as any relation of fondness does.93
By retaining them afterwards in his family, which is the foundation of a constant
intercourse, by procuring their assistance in the labour to which he is subjected, by
connecting them with all his plans and views of interest, [the father’s] attachment is
usually continued and strengthened from the same habits and principles which, in other
cases, give rise to friendship or acquaintance.94
The “science” of stage-theory allowed Millar to chart the historical course of parent-child
relations—and how that course led away from a primitive domestic patriarchalism. The
jurisdiction of the father, Millar notes, is of the same nature as that of the husband: the power of
the strong to oppress the weak. In primitive societies, this authority is absolute. The young child
is entirely governed by “the severe and arbitrary will of the father.”95 This is hardly a matter of
consent. Children have no choice but to submit to the family sovereign.
From their inferiority in strength, they are in no condition to dispute his commands; and
being incapable of maintaining themselves, they depend entirely upon him for
subsistence. To him they must apply for assistance, whenever they are exposed to danger,
91
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or threatened with injustice; and looking upon him as the source of all their enjoyments,
they have every motive to court his favour and to avoid his displeasure.96
But it is not just children who suffer under the yoke of parental authority. The adult who “has
been accustomed from his infancy to serve and to obey his father”97 will carry with him—within
him—the lasting effects of a childhood of acquiescence.
Even after he is grown up, and has arrived at his full strength of body, and maturity of
judgment, he retains the early impressions of his youth, and remains in a great measure
under the yoke of that authority to which he has hitherto submitted. He shrinks at the
angry countenance of his father, and trembles at the power of that arm whose severe
discipline he has so often experienced, and of whose valour and dexterity he has so often
been a witness. He thinks it the highest presumption to dispute the wisdom and propriety
of those commands to which he has always listened, as to an oracle, and which he has
been taught to regard as the infallible rule of his conduct. He is naturally led to acquiesce
in that jurisdiction which he has seen exerted on so many different occasions, and which
he finds to be uniformly acknowledged by all the members of the family.98
It was the “gradual advancement of a people in civilized manners” that “limit[ed] and
restrain[ed] this primitive jurisdiction.”99 One might think that these ameliorating circumstances
softened the paternal character, made the father himself less despotic, Millar says, and to some
extent this is the case. In a life of affluence and security, the father can afford to moderate his
power and “to cultivate those arts which tend to soften and humanize the temper”;100 engaged in
a world of business and social intercourse, the father perforce had to “conform[] to the humours
of those with whom he converses,” to become more patient of being contradicted, and less apt to
indulge in bouts of passion.101 Yet such humanizing is not the first reason Millar advances for
greater restraint on the part of the family patriarch. Millar notes that “[w]hen different families
are united in a larger society,” the father conducts himself on a less private stage. His actions
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will “excite the attention of the public.” And this publicness will subject the father to the
scrutiny of others who have a concern for the welfare of the child.
When different families are united in a larger society, the several members of which have
an intimate correspondence with each other, it may be expected that the exercise of
domestic authority will begin to excite the attention of the public. The near relations of a
family, who have a concern for the welfare of the children, and who have an opportunity
of observing the manner in which they are treated, will naturally interpose by their good
offices, and endeavour to screen them from injustice and oppression. The abuses which,
on some occasions, are known and represented with all their aggravating circumstances,
will excite indignation and resentment, and will at length give rise to such regulations as
are necessary for preventing the like disorders for the future.102
What is more, progress brings about a weakening of the father’s power, allowing other
members of the family to raise themselves “to a state of freedom and independence.”103 In
nations that have made the greatest economic advances, “great liberty is enjoyed by the members
of every family; and the children are no farther subjected to the father than seems necessary for
their advantage.”104 The introduction of “commerce and manufactures” tends to disperse
members of the family; children leave home to learn a profession and earn a livelihood, and, in
the process, “are put in a condition to procure a maintenance without having recourse to the
[father’s] bounty.”105 The paternal jurisdiction is “reduced within narrower bounds, in
proportion to the ordinary improvements of society.”106 By material necessity, Millar writes,
children “are emancipated from their father’s authority.”107 Indeed, Millar concludes his
discussion of parental jurisdiction by cautioning against the tendency of a commercial age to a
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lessening of parental authority of such magnitude that it threatens “proper domestic
subordination.”108
The language of “proper” domestic jurisdiction reminds us that, for Millar, the parent
should have only the degree of authority consistent with “[t]he interest of those who are
governed.”109 Like mankind in general, the child must be allowed to follow the natural course of
human maturation from infancy to adulthood.110 This interest “is the chief circumstance which
ought to regulate the powers committed to a father, as well as those committed to a civil
magistrate.”111 More authority than this is not proper. Whenever the prerogative of the
magistrate, familial or paternal, “is further extended than is requisite for this great end, it
immediately degenerates into usurpation, and is to be regarded as a violation of the natural rights
of mankind.”112 Echoing Locke’s equation of public and private patriarchalism, Millar takes a
(somewhat gratuitous) swipe at Locke’s nemesis, Sir Robert Filmer, “who found[ed] the doctrine
of passive obedience to a monarch, upon the unlimited submission which children owe to their
father.”113 This, Millar contends, is a position that refutes itself. “To say that a king ought to
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enjoy absolute power because a father has enjoyed it,” he argues, “is to defend one system of
oppression by the example of another.”114
“By focusing on familial rights,” Garrett observes, “Millar brought the problem of natural
rights into sharp focus.”115 Millar’s ethnohistory of the family, his “stadial genealogy of
particular rights” (Garrett’s phrase), is built on the notion that rights ought to be construed as
social, not individualistic; as dynamic, not static.116 If the natural condition of human life is
social, then, as O’Neil remarks, “‘natural rights’ have to be discussed within the context of
natural sociability”; they cannot “be divorced either conceptually or normatively from social
existence.”117 For Millar, this is as true of the right to parent as any other. The nature and scope
of parental authority, grounded as they are on the educative role of the parent, evolve in response
to the changing material conditions and moral circumstances of social life. Even this most
“natural” of rights is artificial; even this most personal of rights is socially constructed. If this is
so, Garrett is right to ask the question inevitably, if implicitly, posed by John Millar’s empirical
moral theory: “What is one to make of natural rights at all?”118

II
Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer:
Anti-Patriarchalism and the Libertarian State
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The work of comparative historical jurisprudence was carried on by nineteenth-century
libertarian legal scholars and social theorists, though it was sometimes carried to places where
the moral sentiments of the Scottish Enlightenment were left far behind. In British and
American law, contractualist and libertarian-minded writers relied on stage-theory to outline a
course of progress marked by a growing commitment to individual rights. As free-market
economics and pseudo-Darwinian theory gained a hold on jurisprudential trends, social progress
would be increasingly identified with the protection of personal rights from the reach of the
paternalistic state. (Think Adam Smith of The Wealth of Nations divorced from Adam Smith of
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.119) One would assume that the libertarian theorists of the
second half of the nineteenth century, with their gaze concentrated on personal freedom, would
consistently support a strong regime of parental rights. But this is not the case. It is largely
forgotten, or largely ignored, by those who posit a longstanding heritage for parental rights that
some influential anti-statists also objected to paternal authoritarianism as incompatible with the
progress of liberty.
Sir Henry Maine is familiar to students today—if, indeed, he is familiar—for his
contractualist reading of legal and social history. Herbert Spencer is perhaps known as a rights
theorist who bore the brunt of Justice Holmes’ considerable powers of caustic comment. Today,
these writers find themselves subsumed in the general animosity to all things Lochnerian. It
would be more accurate to say almost all things, for one aspect of Lochnerian jurisprudence has
had a celebrated, if not uncontroversial, legacy. It was the Lochner-era Court that pointed out
the means by which unenumerated rights would make their constitutional appearance; and while
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the use of substantive due process to guarantee economic liberties, such as the right to contract,
in time would fall out of favor (though not entirely disappear120), the personal rights heritage of
Meyer and Pierce would lie dormant, only to flourish in a second coming of unenumerated
rights.

A
Henry Maine
Sir Henry Maine was, to use his own comparison, something of a juridical geologist.121
For him, the rudimentary ideas of the ancients were “what the primary crusts of the earth are to
the geologist,” an empirical record of our own legal lineage.122 And a far more useful record
than metaphysical speculation about a Law of Nature or the unverifiable assumptions of Social
Compact.123 It is only upon a base of “sober research into the primitive history of society and
law,”124 Maine concludes, that a science of jurisprudence can be founded.
For Maine, the path of social progress is the path away from patriarchalism.125 In the
“infancy of the race, men could only account for sustained or periodically recurring action by
supposing a personal agent.”126 The wind, the sun, the earth were divine persons. So, too, in the
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moral world, where the king adjudicated disputes by divine inspiration, “[a] supernatural
presidency is supposed to consecrate and keep together all the cardinal institutions of those
times, the State, the Race, and the Family.”127 The rule of the patriarch was more akin, in
Maine’s words, to commands—and capricious ones at that—than to laws.128 In time, the
authority of the king “gave way to the dominion of aristocracies,” political or religious ruling
councils of chiefs who usurped the royal lawmaking role.129 This conciliar rule was not
legitimated “by supposing an extra-human interposition.”130 Rather, the claim of the “juristical
oligarchy . . . [was] to monopolize the knowledge of the laws, to have the exclusive possession of
principles by which quarrels are decided.”131 From monopolistic authority we move to the great
epoch of public codes, which might afford protection “against the frauds of the privileged
oligarchy and also against the debasement of the national institutions.”132 But the laws of social
development do not guarantee what Maine calls the “upward march” of society.133 The codes
themselves can act as a form of patriarchal despotism—reifying ancient superstitions, rendering
the law little more than a fetishistic observance—to be obeyed as servilely as the most despotic
of rulers.
Like state, like family. The evolution of the family, too, follows the path away from
patriarchalism. The “natural” family is itself a legal fiction, Maine observes. In tracing the
origin of society, he remarks that it would a simple explanation to “suppose that communities
began to exist wherever a family held together instead of separating at the death of its patriarchal
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chieftain.”134 The assumption that “kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of
community”135 held fast as Families aggregated to form Houses, Houses aggregated to form
Tribes, and, finally, Tribes aggregated to form the Commonwealth.136 Members of the
Commonwealth owed their political status, it was presumed, to a common blood line. But,
according to Maine, this fundamental assumption was false.137 In fact, the family was not held
together by blood, but by the admission of others outside the blood line. The family “was being
constantly adulterated by the practice of adoption,”138 that is, by “the absorption of strangers
within its circle.”139 From Family to House to Tribe to Commonwealth, the composition of
society, though assumed to be natural, was, in fact, “in great measure artificial.”140
Though not descended from a common ancestor, the members of the family nonetheless
used this fiction to hold together the primary social unit. The theory of common descent cloaked
the practical reality of “common obedience to the[] highest living ascendant.”141 The family was
the “empire of its ruler,” held together by the patriarchal authority of its chieftain, the type of
command most commonly known by its Roman name, Patria Potestas.142 “It is this patriarchal
aggregate,” claims Maine, “which meets us on the threshold of primitive jurisprudence.”143 In
the early stage of the family empire, the father—or, more precisely, the eldest male parent—
governed a true “domestic despotism.” His word was law, his dominion supreme. The father
held over his children the power of life and death, of uncontrolled corporal punishment, of
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dictating marriage and divorce; and like the rest of the father’s property, the child could be sold
or transferred by adoption.
Change in family law—here, as elsewhere, Maine relies on the law of ancient Rome—
was slow in coming. When it did come, Maine argues, it was part of a greater alteration in what
might be called legal ontology. The ancient law was “binding not on individuals, but on
Families.”144 According to Maine, ancient family lawmaking reached only to the paternal head
of the family. To every other family member, “the rule of conduct is the law of his home, of
which his Parent is the legislator.”145 The ancient law is thus “so framed as to be adjusted to a
system of small independent corporations,” each family being “perpetual and
inextinguishable.”146 Yet, as Millar suggested, the public sphere, with all its legal apparatus and
social pressure, tends to enlarge its scope, and encroachments upon the family’s private domain
are inevitable: “[A]t every point of the progress, a greater number of personal rights and a larger
amount of property are removed from the domestic forum to the cognizance of the public
tribunals.”147
In Roman law, Maine finds “a nearly complete history of of the crumbling away of an
archaic system.”148 Like a child, the law grew up by leaving behind a code of obedience to
paternal dictum, and “a new morality . . . displaced the canons of conduct and the reasons of
acquiescence which were in unions with the ancient usages.”149 The new morality made the
individual, not the family, “the unit of which civil law takes account”; it made individual
obligation, not family dependency, the measure of the law’s binding power.150 The hallmark of
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social progress is a legal regime in which rights and duties are defined by contract, the free
agreement of free individuals. “Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of
society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family,” Maine
claims, “we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these
relations arise from the free agreement of individuals.”151
As the slave is superseded by the servant, as the woman is freed from paternal tutelage
(though not, Maine seems to say, from the tutelage of her husband152), “[s]o too the status of the
Son under Power has no true place in the law.”153 Of course, when the child lacks the capacity to
judge his or her own best interests, the principle of contract cannot apply, but beyond this, “[i]f
any civil obligation binds together the Parent and the child of full age, it is one to which only
contract gives its legal validity.”154 Maine is not sure what causes “helped to mitigate the
stringency of the father’s power over the persons of his children.”155 Interestingly, he suggests
that the circumscribed empire of the father perforce gave way to the needs of Rome’s vast
colonial Empire. The constant wars of conquest must have resulted in the unwillingness of sons
“to regard themselves as the slaves of a despotic master.”156 If the family was “an imperium in
imperio,”157 the route of escape from paternal despotism may have run from empire to Empire.
In work subsequent to Ancient Law, as David Rabban points out, Maine tempered his
frequent assertions . . . about the ubiquity of the patriarchal family in primitive societies,”158

151

Id. at 169.
See id.
153
Id. at 169.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 141.
156
Id. at 139.
157
Id. at 150.
158
DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICA LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY
137 (2013).
152

34

assertions that had not gone unchallenged.159 But Maine’s legacy does not rest on scientific
rigor. His historical jurisprudence (which meant the rejection of theoretical abstractions and
speculation about the state of nature), his evolutionary understanding of cultural norms, his
sociology of power relations—it was on these bases that Maine made such a strong, if relatively
short-lived, contribution to the study of law. And it was on these ethnological underpinnings that
other pioneers in the study of law and society, of various stripes, would build their own
jurisprudential structures.

B
Herbert Spencer

Unlike Millar and Maine, Herbert Spencer begins his sociological inquiries by deducing
first principles of social morality. “Social” morality because, for Spencer, mankind’s social state
is an unalterable fact, a necessity of being.160 These first principles or laws, from which there is
no rational appeal, have their origin in mankind’s impulse to right action—in the Moral Sense.
Though human nature is always changing, always adapting itself to changing circumstances, the
Moral Sense leads us to nature’s unchanging moral rules. These operate with a systematic
constancy equal to the universal and inevitable forces of the physical world—with, Spencer
would say, the unvaryingness that is an essential attribute of the Divine Will. Thus, Spencer
speaks of his work as an effort to understand the moral world as one would the physical:
scientifically.161
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The essence of a scientific morality is to understand the process by which mankind is
“moulded into fitness” for the necessary conditions of life,162 and it is here that Spencer drinks
deeply of comparative jurisprudential history. Put simply, he links his philosophical speculations
to a progressive sociological history. The more obedient we are to the Divine Will—in other
words, the more adapted our society becomes to nature’s laws—the freer we are. This, for
Spencer, is social progress. And mankind, he insists, is a work in progress. Why, he asks, “is
not man adapted to the social state?” His answer:
Simply because he yet partially retains the characteristics that adapted him for an
antecedent state. The respects in which he is not fitted to society are the respects in
which he is fitted for his original predatory life. His primitive circumstances required
that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his own; his present circumstances
require that he should not do so; and in as far as his old attribute still clings to him, in so
far is he unfit for the social state. . . .
Concerning the present position of the human race, we must therefore say, that
man needed one moral constitution to fit him for his original state; that he needs another
to fit him for his present state; and that he has been, is, and will long continue to be, in
process of adaptation. By the term civilization we signify the adaptation that has already
taken place. The changes that constitute progress are the successive steps of the
transition. And the belief in human perfectibility, merely amounts to the belief, that in
virtue of this process, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of
life.163
Originally fitted for a predatory life, one where we sacrifice the happiness of other beings to our
own, mankind must adapt to the moral necessities of a social state. The musculature of the
Moral Sense grows by use—Lamarck, not Darwin, guides the way—and will do so until
mankind is “moulded into complete fitness for the social state.”164 Then, there will be no need
for government to render justice, whether government acts through “the gentle whisperings of
benevolence” or “the harsh threats of law.”165
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Thus, as civilization advances, does government decay. To the bad it is essential; to the
good, not. It is the check which national wickedness makes to itself, and exists only to
the same degree. Its continuance is proof of still-existing barbarism. What a cage is to
the wild beast, law is to the selfish man. Restraint is for the savage, the rapacious, the
violent; not for the just, the gentle, the benevolent. All necessity for external force
implies a morbid state. Dungeons for the felon; a strait-jacket for the maniac; crutches
for the lame; stays for the weak-backed; for the infirm of purpose a master; for the foolish
a guide; but for the sound mind, in a sound body, none of these. Were there no thieves
and murderers, prisons would be unnecessary. It is only because tyranny is yet rife in the
world that we have armies. Barristers, judges, juries—all the instruments of law—exist,
simply because knavery exists. Magisterial force is the sequence of social vice; and the
policeman is but the complement of the criminal. Therefore it is that we call government
“a necessary evil.”166
When the human faculties are “moulded into complete fitness for the social state,” there will be
no need for the state to restrain the wicked—or to support the poor, or to protect the consumer, or
regulate commerce, or to educate the young. These “mechanical” measures, so Spencer argues,
only retard the growth of the sympathetic faculty—the charity prompted by the heart—that is the
hallmark of social progress.167 There will be no need for government at all. The, it must be that
“the things we call evil and immorality will disappear; so surely must man become perfect.”168
We must follow, Spencer reminds us, where scientific morality leads. First, we must
listen to the monitions of the Moral Sense, to this “instinct of personal rights—a feeling that
leads [each of us] to claim as great a share of natural privilege as is claimed by others”—a
feeling that leads mankind to repel anything like an encroachment upon personal freedom.169
This instinct is a purely selfish one, “leading each man to assert and defend his own liberty of
action”;170 but it is through this same “instrumentality” of the Moral Sense that “we receive
satisfaction on paying another what is due to him.”171 Justice, that is, “is nothing but a
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sympathetic affection of the instinct of personal rights—a sort of reflex function of it.”172 From
this yoking together of Self and Sympathy emerges the law of equal freedom: “Every man has
freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.”173
Second, we must adapt so that we are fitted to the law. Because it is derived “directly” from the
Divine Will, the law of equal freedom “is of higher authority than all other laws.”174 It is
absolute moral law. All man-made institutions, all merely social forms, are subordinate to it;
they must “marshal themselves as it commands.”175 There is no safety, he writes, “but in entire
obedience” to this principle.176
Spencer insists on this point because some of the conclusions “inevitably following” from
them will seem strange or impracticable.177 This is a warning he is at pains to make again before
turning to a discussion of parental authority. If “that first principle from which rights are
derived, turns out to be a source from which we may derive the rights of children,” he cautions,
“we have no choice but to abide by the result.”178 The caution is warranted, Spencer contends,
because the demonstration of equal liberty “is fully as complete when used on behalf of the
child, as when used on behalf of the man.”179 To get here, Spencer retraces the basic steps of his
moral philosophy:
1. God wills human happiness.
2. Happiness is attainable only through the use of our faculties.
3. For the production of happiness, these faculties must be exercised.

172

Id.
Id. at 121.
174
Id. at 217-18.
175
Id. at 218. The law of equal liberty “dates from creation; [all other institutions and social forms] are of yesterday.
It is constant; they are changeable. It appertains to the perfect; they to the imperfect. It is coenduring with
humanity; they may die tomorrow. As surely then as the incidental must bow before the necessary, so surely must
all conventional arrangements be subject to the absolute moral law.” See id.
176
Id. at 65.
177
Id. at 65.
178
Id. at 191.
179
Id. at 192.
173

38

4. The exercise of these faculties presupposes liberty of action.180
“The child’s happiness, too, is willed by the Deity,” Spencer maintains; “the child, too, has
faculties to be exercised; the child, too, needs scope for the exercise of those faculties.”181 And,
therefore, the child “has claims to freedom—rights as we call them—coextensive with those of
the adult. We cannot avoid this conclusion, if we would.”182
Like Millar, Spencer treats parent-child relations as part of history’s grand procession.
Social progress occurs—simultaneously, and at the same pace—on two fronts: the family and
the state. “Despotism in the state,” Spencer asserts, “is necessarily associated with despotism in
the family. The two being alike moral in their origin, cannot fail to coexist.”183 Indeed, and here
we find an echo of the Scottish Enlightenment, the condition of a people can be judged by how
its most vulnerable members—women and children—are treated, publicly and privately: “To the
same extent that the triumph of might over right is seen in a nation’s political institutions, it is
seen in its domestic ones.”184 Spencer applauds the fact that society was sloughing off the
ancient subordination of women (though too slowly; as an advocate of full political and social
rights for women, Spencer knew there was much work left to be done). Gender subordination
“implies the use of command,” according to Spencer, and whenever authority has to use the
voice of command—to use, as Spencer puts it, “the modern forms of bygone despotism and
slavery”— it “reveals its descent from barbarism.”185
The desire to command is essentially a barbarous desire. . . . Command cannot be
otherwise than savage, for it implies an appeal to force, should force be needful. Behind
its “You Shall,” there lies the scarcely hidden, “If you won’t, I’ll make you.” Command
is the growl of coercion crouching in ambush. Or we might aptly term it—violence in a
180
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latent state. All its accessories—its frown, its voice, its gestures, prove it akin to the
ferocity of the uncivilized man. Command is the foe of peace, for it breeds war of words
and feelings—sometimes of deeds. It is inconsistent with the first law of morality. It is
radically wrong.186
Spencer defines despotism “as the making of another’s will bend to the fulfillment of our
own”; slavery is simply despotism’s counterpart: “having our will subordinated to the will of
another.”187 Though we usually use these terms “only when the rule of one will over another is
extreme,” Spencer refuses to let the petty autocrat escape moral censure just because his rule
does not take the most oppressive form: “[I]f the subjection of man to man is bad when carried
to its full extent, it is bad in any degree.”188 The “arbitrary rule of one human being over
another” must be rejected, “no matter in what form it may appear.”189
Even when it appears in the form of parental care. By way of analogy to marital
relations, Spencer looks at parent-child relations with an unsentimental eye: “If it be true that the
dominion of man over woman has been oppressive in proportion to the badness of the age or the
people, it is also true that parental authority has been stringent and unlimited in a like
proportion.”190 Spencer sees, as mentioned, an oppressive harmony “between the political,
connubial, and filial relationships,”191 the common denominator being the use of coercion,
prompted by selfishness and moral blindness. But Spencer has a special antipathy toward the
assertion of paternal control: “Uncover its roots, and the theory of paternal authority will be
found not to grow out of man’s love for his offspring but out of his love of dominion.”192
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It is paternal authority that Spencer considers “the main obstacle to the right conduct of [a
child’s] education.”193 Spencer thinks that education, properly understood, is a leading away
from dependency—this is what he means by the development of “character”—but coercive
parenting is utterly unfit for this task. Instead of changing character, “coercion can manifestly do
nothing but forcibly mould externals into a coarse semblance of such a state.”194 Coercion can
only change conduct. Here, too, Spencer treats the state and the family as analogous: “In the
family, as in society, [coercion] can simply restrain; it cannot educate.”195 Left alone, children
might somehow find their way to maturity, but they are not left alone. They are mis-educated,
taught by example the lessons of selfishness, taught what Spencer calls the “evil disposition” to
sacrifice the happiness of others to our own.196
Fathers and mothers who enlarge upon the trouble which filial misbehaviour entails upon
them, strangely assume that all the blame is due to the evil propensities of their offspring
and none to their own. Though on their knees they confess to being miserable sinners,
yet to hear their complaints of undutiful sons and daughters you might suppose that they
were themselves immaculate.197
Of course, parents are not immaculate. They issue commands “for their own convenience or
gratification,” rather than for “corrective purposes.”198 They enact a new era of old despotism
and slavery, where parental power (“the ire of an offended ruler”) is substituted for moral force.
Observe, too, the impulse under which a refractory child is punished. Instead of anxiety
for the delinquent’s welfare, that severe eye and compressed lip denote rather the ire of
an offended ruler—express some inward thought as “You little wretch, we’ll soon see
who is to be master. . . . Let any one who doubts this listen to that common reprimand,
“How dare you disobey me?” and then consider what the emphasis means.199
193
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It is not that what Spencer calls “moral-force education” is impracticable; it is that parents are
not “civilized enough to use it.”200
Spencer saw signs, in modern society and the modern family, that times were changing.
“[T]he decline in the rigour of paternal authority and in the severity of political oppression,” he
remarks, “has been simultaneous.”201 The rapid growth of “democratic feeling” was
accompanied “by a tendency toward systems of non-coercive education—that is, toward a
practical admission of the rights of children.”202 But not, Spencer hastens to add, the rights of
parents. Whatever claim parental care establishes for the parent, it establishes “no title of
dominion.”203 However solicitous parents are in the fulfillment of their obligations, they obtain
no right thereby “to play the master” over the child.204

IV
Meyer, Pierce, and the Specter of the Paternalistic State

The specter of the socialist state was no new bogeyman when Arthur Mullen stood before
the Supreme Court to denounce “the principle of the soviet.” It was state control of the economy
that drew cries of socialist menace at the turn of the nineteenth century. But for the prime
movers of socialism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, it was not just private property that was
holding back progress toward a truly egalitarian state. It was the private family as well.
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Working within the sociohistorical tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment,205 Marx and Engels
saw the “freedoms” of the libertarian minimalist state as but a stage, and a barbaric one at that,
that would be superseded, both materially and morally, by a higher stage where mankind would
be liberated from all patriarchal relations.206 As others have pointed out, Marx criticized Maine
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On the Scottish Enlightenment and historical materialism, see Meek, supra note 9, at 270-320; ARNAND C.
CHITNIS, THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: A SOCIAL HISTORY 118 (1976).
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See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Chapter 2), in 1 MARX/ENGELS SELECTED WORKS
123-24 (Moscow, Progress Publishers 1969) (1848):
Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.
On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its
completely developed form, this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its
complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.
The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish
with the vanishing of capital.
Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead
guilty.
But, you say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.
And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you
educate, by the intervention direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, &c.? The Communists have
not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that
intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.
The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parents and
child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties
among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce
and instruments of labour.
But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the bourgeoisie in chorus.
The bourgeois sees his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production
are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion that the lot of being
common to all will likewise fall to the women.
He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere
instruments of production.
For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of
women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The
Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.
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“for not recognizing that in progressive societies individualism would be superseded by
collectivism, for not being enough of an evolutionist to recognize that evolution would reach
later and better stages.”207
Working within its own variant of stage theory, communist ideology made the dissolution
of the family the last step of the upward march of society.208 Marx and Engels were not the first
to imagine the abolition of the family. Nineteenth-century communitarians had envisioned new
family structures,209 but where earlier Utopians like Charles Fourier and Robert Owen saw the
abolition of the family as a means to liberate natural desire, Marx and Engels “held forth the
hope that, instead of submitting to nature, communist society would be shaped by humans freely
creating. People would no longer be subject to what is natural.”210 Marx and Engels wanted a
new human nature brought into being by new political constitutions. As Richard Weikart writes,
the decisive move of communist theory was a “move away from the naturalism of their
predecessors.”211 What was natural was to coerce, and utopian social arrangements could render
human relationships free from the dictates of nature. Including the relationship of parent to
child. “Even if people had a natural bond to their children,” Weikart observes, “no provision

Our bourgeois, not content with having wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to
speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other’s wives.
Bourgeois marriage is, in reality, a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists
might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically
concealed, an openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident that the abolition of the
present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from
that system, i.e., of prostitution both public and private.
207
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would be made for this in communist society.”212 The public domain would not just check
domestic patriarchalism; it would altogether abolish the hold of the parent on the child.
So Mullen knew what he was about.
What Robert Meyer wanted was modest enough: the “right to teach . . . foreign
languages and other branches in addition to the curriculum required by the public schools.”213
Meyer, who was a school teacher at a parochial school, had framed the case as implicating his
due process rights to pursue a calling and to enter into contracts. Here, as in Pierce, the parents
upset by state educational regulations were not parties to the litigation. But Mullen was betting
that the Court would take a broader view of the interests at stake. He was right. Writing for the
Court, Justice McReynolds was not reluctant to widen the field of constitutional inquiry:
“Evidently the Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern
language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of
parents to control the education of their own.”214 Of these three interferences, as it turned out, it
was the last would count most.
Concern about a state educational monopoly had been voiced before by the courts. By
1918 all states had passed compulsory school attendance legislation, and state enforcement
mechanisms were increasingly efficient. The success of such laws prompted a number of rightsbased challenges to state control of education. For the most part, these constitutional claims met
only modest success. Direct assaults on the state’s power to mandate compulsory school
attendance were rejected on the familiar ground that “[t]he natural rights of a parent to the
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custody and control of his infant child are subordinate to the power of the state, and may be
restricted and regulated by municipal laws.”215 Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Indiana
maintained, what was truly “natural” was the fiduciary educational duty of the parent:
One of the most important natural duties of the parent is his obligation to educate his
child, and this duty he owes not to the child only, but to the commonwealth. If he
neglects to perform it or willfully refuses to do so, he may be coerced by law to execute
such civil obligation. The welfare of the child and the best interests of society require
that the state shall exert its sovereign authority to secure to the child the opportunity to
acquire an education.216
Yet several late-nineteenth-century courts, seeking some check on state regulation of the
family, did uphold parental challenges to specific courses that were a (sometimes required,
State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 731-32 (Ind. 1901); cf. State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409 (1870) (“The matter of education
is deemed a legitimate function of the state, and with us is imposed upon the legislature as a duty by imperative
provisions of the constitution. . . . In some countries, and even in some of our American states, education has for
more than a century been made compulsory upon the parent, by the infliction of direct penalties for its neglect. The
right of the parent to ruin his child either morally or physically has no existence in nature. The subject has always
been regarded as within the purview of legislative authority.”); Stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131, 132 (N.J. Juv. &
Dom. Rel. 1937) (“This statute is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state. The object of the legislation
was to create an enlightened American citizenship in sympathy with our principles and ideals, and to prevent
children reared in America from remaining ignorant and illiterate. If it is within the police power of the state to
regulate wages, to legislate respecting housing conditions in crowded cities, to prohibit dark rooms in tenement
houses, to compel landlords to place windows in their tenements which will enable their tenants to enjoy the
sunshine, it is within the police power of the state to compel every resident of New Jersey so to educate his children
that the light of American ideals will permeate the life of our future citizens.”); State v. Williams, 56 S.D. 370
(1929).
216
State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. at 732. In the 1886 case State v. Webber, the Indiana state supreme court found nothing
arbitrary in the enforcement of state educational requirements. “The power to establish graded schools carries with
it, of course,” the court pointed out, “the power to establish and enforce such reasonable rules as may seem
necessary to the trustees, in their discretion, for the government and discipline of such schools, and prescribing the
course of instruction therein.” 8 N.E. 708, 711 (Ind. 1886). It was the will of the parent that smacked of
arbitrariness, and the state was under no obligation to accommodate it.
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The important question arises, which should govern the public high school of the city of La Porte, as to the
branches of learning to be taught and the course of instruction therein,—the school trustees of such city, to
whom the law has confided the direction of these matters, or the mere arbitrary will of the relator [i.e., the
parent], without cause or reason in its support? We are of opinion that only one answer can or ought to be
given to this question. The arbitrary wishes of the relator in the premises must yield and be subordinated to
the governing authorities of the school city of La Porte, and their reasonable rules and regulations for the
government of the pupils of its high school.
Id. at 713-14. For the supreme court of New Hampshire, it was novel doctrine that “each parent had the power . . .
to decide the question what studies the scholars should pursue, or what exercises they should perform.” Kidder v.
Chellis, 59 N.H. 473, 476 (1879). This would be a power “of disorganizing the school, and practically rendering it
substantially useless;” and “however judicious it may be to consult the wishes of parents, the disintegrating principle
of parental authority to prevent all classification and destroy all system in any school, public or private, is unknown
to the law.” Id.
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sometimes optional) part of the public school curriculum. In these cases, the parent was given a
paramount right to choose what courses his child would take from those dictated by the statemandated curriculum. Though the presumption was that the parent would make “a wise and
judicious selection,” the rights of the parent, not the best interests of the child, were the focus of
judicial attention.217
In 1919, Nebraska and sixteen other states passed statutes prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages in private as well as public schools. To the Nebraska Supreme Court, hearing
a challenge to the state language prohibition law, the salutary purpose of the legislation was
clear, and well within the sphere of the state’s police power.218 In dissent, Judge Charles B.
Letton protested that the measure upset the proper allocation of educational control between
parent and state, and thereby “infringe[d] upon the fundamental rights and liberty of a citizen
protected by the state and federal Constitutions.”219 Letton conceded that the state could manage
and control private schools, but the state had no right “to prevent parents from bestowing upon
their children a full measure of education in addition to the state required branches.”
Has it the right to prevent the study of music, of drawing, of handiwork, in classes or
private schools, under the guise of police power? If not, it has no power to prevent the
study of French, Spanish, Italian, or any other foreign or classic language, unless such
study interferes with the education in the language of our country, prescribed by the
statute.220
Before the Court in 1923, Mullen held out the awful prospect of a state parenting
monopoly. He portrayed the case as one about “the power of a legislative majority to take the
Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875); cf. Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039, 1043 (Neb. 1914) (“But in this
age of agitation, such as the world has never known before, we want to be careful lest we carry the doctrine of
governmental paternalism too far, for, after all is said and done, the prime factor in our scheme of government is the
American home.”); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 456 (1868) (“Our conclusion is, that family government is
recognized by law as being as complete in itself as the State government is in itself, and yet subordinate to it; and
that we will not interfere with or attempt to control it in favor of either husband or wife, unless in cases where
permanent or malicious injury is inflicted or threatened, or the condition of the party is intolerable.”).
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child from the parent.”221 In this he had the support of law professor William D. Guthrie, whose
amicus brief addressed the constitutionality of state laws requiring attendance at public schools,
specifically the Oregon statute that had been adopted by popular initiative in 1922.222 In her
pioneering study of the Court’s seminal due process parenting cases, Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse notes that “[p]aradoxically, Guthrie’s enlistment in the battle against universal
common schooling had its greatest impact not on the Oregon law but on the Supreme Court’s
handling of the language laws in Meyer v. Nebraska.”223
By 1923, Guthrie was no stranger to litigation pitting parent against state. He had
opposed child welfare measures, Woodhouse contends, because they “were the first step toward
expropriating the children of America and ending the supremacy of their fathers as governors of
hearth and home.”224 This “supremacy,” for Guthrie, was not an expression of command, as it
might have been for Spencer; it was the most natural expression of a parent’s hopes for the child.
Children are, in the end, what men and women live for. Through them parents realize, as
it were, immortality. To the parent the child represents the sum of all his hopes. One’s
defeated aspirations, his children may achieve; his unfulfilled ambitions, they may
realize. All that we missed, lost, failed of, our children may have, do, accomplish, in
fullest measure.225
What business had the state meddling in matters like these? To Guthrie, as Woodhouse says,
state regulation of the domestic sanctuary “violated the divinely ordained natural order and
contravened a man’s liberty, property, and religious freedoms—guaranteed by the First, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments—to direct the life of his family.”226
Writing while the Red Scare continued to grip the nation, Guthrie described the
221
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Oregon act as “a revolutionary piece of legislation,” evoking images of Bolshevik menace.227
But communism, as revolutionary as it was, was just the latter-day face of a state paternalism
that would turn back the cultural clock to a social stage “long ago repudiated.”
Anything more un-American and more in conflict with the fundamental principles of our
institutions, it would be difficult to imagine. . . . The notion of Plato that in a Utopia the
state would be the sole repository of parental authority and duty and the children be
surrendered to it for upbringing and education, was long ago repudiated as impossible
and impracticable in a workaday world where men and women lived, loved, had children
and sought advancement in the struggle of life.228
With communism providing a ready target, with Plato’s Republic “a convenient
shorthand,” as Woodhouse writes, for the socialist state,229 parental advocates, like Mullen and
Guthrie, turned on its head the anti-patriarchal model of social progress. They deplored “[t]he
notion of Plato that in a Utopia the state would be the sole repository of parental authority and
duty and the children be surrendered to it for upbringing and education.”230 In their view, a state
educational monopoly would “change the entire course of the human race.”231 Socialism was
just modern barbarism, and the barbarians were at the gates.232
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In The Republic and in The Laws, Plato offered a vision of a unified society, where the
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Conclusion
For supporters of parental rights, Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny are a measure of how
far we have traveled from the paternalism of the past. These cases would become the
constitutional starting point for those who argue that the right to parent is a legal and moral
bulwark against state regulation.
In the 1920’s, as today, the radical open-endedness of the “liberty” protected by the Due
Process Clause was, to say the least, problematic. Then, as now, the Court sought some
historical marker to guide the due process inquiry:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things
have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.233
Which leaves an obvious question: Was the right to parent among those privileges long
recognized at common law? The answer is not as obvious.
In 1879, Louise Hart left her husband Charles, taking with her the couple’s infant son,
Charles Hart, Jr. Louise claimed that her separation was justified by her husband’s abusive
conduct. Denying the allegations of cruelty, Charles countered that Louise was without legal
right to possess and restrain the child. He petitioned the court on a writ of habeas corpus to
obtain custody of his son.234
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by pointing out that the conflict’s
resolution really depended on whose common law is being talked about. If the controversy were
to be decided by the ancient common law of England, “there would be little difficulty in granting
the prayer of the petitioner [i.e., the father].”235 British common law (prior to nineteenth-century
reforms) “conceded to a father the undoubted right as guardian by nature and for nurture of his
minor child.”236 The doctrine was a stringent one, “founded on . . . the recognized relation in
which a husband stood, as the head of the family, to both wife and children, having a right to
control the person of his wife, so that he could enforce a restoration to conjugal duty, and to the
persons and services of his children.”237
The problem for Mr. Hart was that the British common law doctrine—“it may safely be
affirmed,” the court said—“was never received as recognized law of Pennsylvania.”238
Pennsylvania courts
have given a more liberal, a more humane application the principle of the controlling
power of the State as parens patriae, looking more to the defense of those who are unable
to defend themselves, and to the interest which society has in the proper care and training
of children upon whom it is to depend upon its future existence.239
For the Hart court, the parent-child relation was not a legal entity unto itself. The relation has a
public dimension, making the family in part a public franchise:
As in the contract of marriage, there are three parties whose interests and rights are to be
considered: those of the husband; the wife; and the State; so in all questions touching the
custody of children there are three interests involved: those of the parents; of the State;
and of the infant; and of these three the consideration which is most important and
controlling is the latter, because upon its proper determination the interests of the other
two are in a great degree dependent.240
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This network of interests, so the court said, is protected by the equitable principles that play an
“illustrious part” in the state’s common law. And it has been this way, the court went on, “from
the beginning.” The state of Pennsylvania had never “been bound to a strict adherence as to the
old common law rules as to the custody of children.”241
In this regard, Pennsylvania was hardly unique. Reviewing the case law of the nineteenth
century, Lewis Hochheimer—his treatise on the law of child custody was a familiar reference for
courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—concluded that “[t]he general result
of the American cases may be characterized as an utter repudiation of the notion, that there can
be such a thing as a proprietary right of interest in or to the custody of an infant.”242 It is true, of
course, that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as today, claims of right (natural and
civil) were advanced in support of parental power.243 Still, as Hochheimer observed, the
prevailing legal current, driven by the equitable force of trust principles, had swept away such
“narrow contentions.”
The entire tendency of the American courts is, to put aside with an unsparing hand all
technical objections and narrow contentions whereby it may be attempted to erect claims
of supposed legal right, on a foundation of wrong to persons who are a peculiar object of
the solicitude and protecting care of the law.244
241
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Far from being absolute, the rights of the parent were not even the custody courts’
primary consideration. “The true view,” as one mid-nineteenth century court put it, “is that the
rights of the child are alone to be considered, and those rights clearly are to be protected.”245 The
very idea that parents have rights as parents was called into question. The New York Court for
the Correction of Errors was not alone when it declared that “there is no parental authority
independent of the supreme power of the state. But the former is derived altogether from the
latter.”246
When the Supreme Court in Meyer and Pierce enrolled the right to parent among those
privileges long recognized at common law, it fabricated the right it purported to find. It was an
ambitious task, one that involved a rewriting of legal history. And more. In the shadow of the
Russian Revolution, the Court set itself in opposition to the antipatriarchal story of progress that
had such currency throughout the nineteenth century. With Sparta as its communistic demon, the
Court took two cases about state educational regulations and made them the vehicle for a
statement about the history of the entire human race.

paramount to the claims of either parent. . . . [J]udicial precedents, judicial dicta, and legislative enactments all lead
to one and the same irresistible conclusion. The primary object of the American decisions is then to secure the
welfare of the child, and not the special claims of one or the other parent.”) (footnote omitted); English v. English,
32 N.J. Eq. 738, 742–43 (N.J. Err. & App. 1880) (“In considering the grounds which should have weight in deciding
controversies of this character, while the rights of parents will not be disregarded or their interests overlooked, the
court will not be controlled in its decision by the strict rights of either party, but will determine the question of
custody mainly upon considerations of advantage to the infant; the cardinal rule of action governing the court being
regard to the benefits of the minor, holding its welfare superior to the claims of either parent.”); cf. also
“Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family,” 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1223 (1980) (“[Nineteenthcentury custody courts] often held that the presumption of parental custody was based upon the extent to which the
parent successfully served the state’s interest in promoting the child’s welfare, rather than upon any inherent right of
the parent. Most late nineteenth century courts thus acknowledged that the child’s welfare, not the parent’s legal
right, was the determinative factor in private custody decisions under the parens patriae power.”) (footnotes
omitted).
245
In re 5 New York Legal Observer 265, 267 (N.Y. Super. 1847).
246
Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 103 (N.Y. 1840).
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